Washington Examiner 04/03/2007
By Michael Shank and Shukria Dellawar

President Hamid Karzai’s decision to provide immunity for all war crimes in the last 25 years now makes reconciliation utterly unviable. Backed by Afghanistan’s lower and upper houses with tacit United States support (fearful warlord ties could surface in court), the government stated that amnesty was a critical step towards reconciliation. In fact, the opposite is true. Immunity makes reconciliation impossible.

First, immunity sets a precedent for bad behavior. Second, it fails to address victims’ needs (in fact, re-victimizes them). Third, it shows Karzai has no power and government warlords run Kabul.

If Karzai cares about real reconciliation in his divided country, then warlords must be held accountable and victims’ needs must be addressed. Short of establishing a fair judicial system, perhaps a few lessons from Indonesia, Nepal and South Africa are necessary to show the way toward a successful disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process — and ultimately reconciliation.

First order of business: disarm warlords in power. Afghanistan continues to employ warlords who maintain militias outside Kabul. Until they disarm, victims remain fearful, Karzai’s hands remain tied, and democratic governance remains an afterthought.

Take a lesson from Nepal, where Maoist armaments are under United Nations lock and key while Maoists fill government seats. To achieve this, U.N. assistance must be summoned — as the U.S., European Union and NATO are content with Kabul’s warlords.

Second order of business: Demobilize and reintegrate militias. After disarming, incentivize ex-combatants to pursue legitimate jobs lest they return to lucrative militia work. This task is critical, given that gun-toting garners five times the salary of public sector work.

Take a lesson from Indonesia, where Acehnese ex-combatants, disarming from 30 years of combat, returned to townships to campaign politically, receive job training and reintegrate socially. Like in Aceh, where the EU funded demobilization and reintegration programs, the international community must play a role in funding economic development in Afghanistan.

Third order of business: reconcile war crimes. Ignoring harm done to Afghanistan’s people will not magically wipe the slate clean. Victims need a process that recognizes, legitimizes and brings justice to grievances. Without this, injustice remains, fostering frustration and violence.

Take a lesson from South Africa, where perpetrators were granted amnesty after — not before — they admitted wrongdoings. Though imperfect, South Africa’s reconciliation process voiced victims’ needs and created incentives for violators to acknowledge past sins — two components absent in Afghanistan.

None of these initiatives are easy. In the absence of a judicial system that protects its citizenry, these steps are essential to heal the nation and pave the road for a stable state free of criminal warfare.

Until the warlords disarm, militias demobilize and reintegrate, and a reconciliation process legitimizes victims’ rights while holding perpetrators accountable, Karzai will remain impotent, frustration will plague victims and bad behavior will be rampant.
Karzai cannot be expected to respond alone. International efforts, however, remain focused primarily on military offensives with less than 10 percent of all international aid allocated for economic development programs. The remaining ninety percent of funding is committed to warring in the south, making disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration even more unrealizable.

For Afghanistan to successfully pursue a reconciliation process, it must take note of lessons from Nepal, Indonesia and South Africa, and direct donors to do the same. For justice to prevail long-term, a functioning judicial system is required. In the short term, however, save for those with blood on their hands, immunity helps no one.

Michael Shank is the government relations officer and Shukria Dellawar is a masters student at George Mason University’s Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution.